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Abstract—Energy efficiency is one of the most important
parameters for designing and building a computing system nowa-
days. Introduction of new transistor and memory technologies
to the integrated circuits design have brought hope for low
energy very large scale integration (VLSI) circuit design. This
excellency is pleasant if the computing system is secure and the
energy is not wasted through execution of malicious actions. In
fact, it is required to make sure that the utilized transistor and
memory devices function correctly and no error occurs in the
system operation. In this regard, we propose a built-in-self-test
architecture for security checking of the magnetic tunnel junction
(MTJ) device under malicious process variations attack. Also, a
general identification technique is presented to investigate the
behavior and activities of the employed circuitries within this
MTJ testing architecture. The presented identification technique
tries to find any abnormal behavior using the circuit current
signal.
Index Terms—Magnetic Tunnel Junction; Signal Processing for
Security; Built-In-Self-Test; Emerging Technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous connectivity among computing systems is
increasing and consequently significant growth is happening in
the amount of data to be processed, transmitted, and stored by
these systems. This situation brings a proper environment for
adversaries to exploit possible backdoors in software and/or
hardware to perform malicious purposes. Besides security,
another design parameter that is highly critical for computing
systems, especially in mobile devices, is energy. The dream
of building a smart city with having millions of electronic
devices around us is not possible, unless making them energy
efficient.
Recently, new transistor and memory technologies are intro-
duced to the very large scale integration (VLSI) circuit design
for the sake of low energy consumption, especially due to the
device scaling barriers of the CMOS technology. These devices
such as magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) and tunnel field-effect
transistor (TFET) are able to drop the energy consumption of
electronic circuits remarkably. Although their merit is not only
limited to energy reduction since they have unique features and
properties applicable for security purposes [1]. For example,
TFET can make the cryptographic processors to be more
resilient toward side-channel attack. However, it should not
be neglected that these properties can come to the aid of
an attacker as well. An adversary may find a crack to cause
performance degradation, functionality failure, acceleration of
reliability issues and so forth.
Therefore, development of novel VLSI testing and security
checking techniques is mandatory with focus on these emerg-
ing devices. This work proposes a built-in-self-test architecture
for security checking of the magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ)
device under malicious process variations attack, in Section 2.
Also, a general identification technique is presented to detect
any abnormality in the behavior and activities of the employed
circuitries within the MTJ testing architecture, in Section 3.
We conclude the paper in Section 4.
II. TESTING AND SECURITY CHECKING OF MAGNETIC
TUNNEL JUNCTION
Spintronics is the foundation of the next generation of mem-
ory technologies with having superior features such as energy
efficiency, speed, and density in compare to the traditional
memory technologies. Magnetic tunnel junction (MTJ) is the
basic storage device in the Spintronics field that provides
data non-volatility, fast data access, and low voltage circuit
operation. These properties make this device a fit candidate
for memory elements of the IoT devices [2]. However, the
MTJ device may suffer from reliability issues [3] that can
come to the aid of an attacker to perform malicious purposes.
In this work, the impact of free layer thickness (Tm) malicious
variations on the perpendicular magnetic anisotropy (PMA)-
based MTJ device (shown in in Figure 1) operation is analyzed
using the SPICE models for magnetic tunnel junctions based
on mono-domain approximation [4]. This attack can cause
logical transitions of the MTJ device earlier or later than the
expected time (displayed in Figure 2), leading to an incorrect
logical state sensing and its propagation throughout the system
(especially in high clock frequencies).
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Fig. 1. The perpendicular magnetic anisotropy-based magnetic tunnel junction
device structure.
One solution for preventing any possible timing failure
caused by the reliability-related security issues is using run-
time timing errors detection and possibly correction in order to
keep a processing core performance close to its golden perfor-
mance. According to this solution, a built-in-self-test module
for reliability and security (BIST-RS) analysis is included
inside the original design. The BIST-RS functionality can be
classified to: (a) error detection; (b) error prediction; and (c)
error masking. The BIST-RS functionality in ”error detection”
is described as monitoring the signals of logical paths for
transitions after the clock edge and flagging a possible error.
In here, a BIST-RS architecture for analyzing the reliability
and security of the MTJ device under malicious process
variations attack is presented that is shown in Figure 3. This
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Fig. 2. The free layer thickness malicious variations impact on the MTJ
device resistance.
architecture consists of three main elements: Data Encoder,
MTJ Structure (i.e. an array of the MTJ cells), and Data
Decoder. The data encoder has the responsibility of capturing
the applied test pattern, calculating its fingerprint, and con-
structing the sender message. The MTJ structure is a physical
transmission medium (i.e. the communication channel) with
the functionality of correctly conveying data to the receiver.
A healthy MTJ structure doesn’t change the information and
provides them to the data decoder on time. A single malicious
MTJ cell (i.e. when the value of its free layer thickness is
outside the acceptable range of variations) can change the
conveying information. Regarding the logical state of each
MTJ device, it is stayed the same or a transition happens
depending on its corresponding bit in the applied test pattern.
The data decoder checks the receiver message and declares its
integrity status using the error signal. If the logical state of
the error signal is high, it implies that the MTJ structure is
not reliable/healthy and vice versa.
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Fig. 3. The BIST-RS architecture for reliability and security analysis of the
magnetic tunnel junction device.
The data encoder and the data decoder are demonstrated
practically through hardware implementation of the cyclic
redundancy check (CRC) using TFET technology. We use 20
nm AlGaSb/InAs tunnel field effect transistor (TFET) tech-
nology (provided in the Universal TFET model 1.6.8 [5]) for
implementation. TFET provides steeper sub-threshold slope
(i.e. smaller than 60 mV/dec) [6] and is described as a gated
p-i-n (i.e. the hole-dominant region, the intrinsic (pure) region,
and the electron-dominant region) diode that has asymmetrical
doping structure and operates under reverse-bias condition.
The steeper sub-threshold slope of the TFET device helps to
further down scale the supply voltage and reduce the leakage
currents substantially, which makes it an excellent candidate
to achieve low energy consumption for the IoT applications.
The comparison between the drain-source current (IDS) versus
gate-source voltage (VGS) curves of the n-type MOSFET and
the n-type TFET is shown in Figure 4. For simulating this
plot, both devices have the same width and length of 20 nm
and are connected to the supply voltage of 0.6 V. As it can
be seen from the figure, the TFET device turns ON and goes
to its saturation region at a smaller value of the gate-source
voltage in compare to the MOSFET device. Thus, the TFET
technology is favorable for low voltage design.
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Fig. 4. The comparison between the drain-source current versus gate-source
voltage curves of the n-type MOSFET and the n-type TFET.
Cyclic redundancy check is an error detection code that is
used for authentic data transmission between a source and
a destination [7]. The input and output signals of the data
encoder and the data decoder can be seen in Figure 5. The
actual names of Y-axis labels are Clock, Data Reset, Data
Enable, Output Logic 0, Output Logic 1, Check Reset, Check
Enable, and Error in order. The clock signal has the period of 3
ns and the width of 6 ns. The reset mechanism of the encoder
can be active before the arrival of the second clock cycle
positive edge. Once it is disabled, the test pattern is applied
and the data capturing signal is enabled. The constructed
message is provided in the middle of the second clock cycle
and around 7.5 ns. The fourth and fifth plots in Figure 5 show
the example logic zero and logic one of the encoder output
signals. Resetting the decoder element can be continued until
the arrival of the third clock cycle positive edge. During this
period, all of the flip-flops of the receiver remainder register
are set to logic one. After the arrival of the third clock cycle
positive edge, the error signal goes to logic zero or stays at
logic one depending on the delivered message integrity status.
Each cell in the MTJ structure contains a driving and
sensing circuit for its magnetic tunnel junction, which is shown
in the bottom of Figure 3. The operation of this circuit can
be described in this way: (a) converting the voltage signal
of a bit in the message to the current signal; (b) applying
the current signal to the magnetic tunnel junction under test;
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Fig. 5. The TFET-based data encoder and data decoder input and output
signals.
and (c) finding the absolute value of the voltage signal at the
free layer terminal since the voltage polarization is different
between the MTJ logic transitions; (d) eliminating the signal
offset to make sure that it is symmetric; and (e) comparing it
to half of the supply voltage to construct the output signal
based on the corresponding voltages of the logical states.
Figure 6 indicates the circuit operation flow for zero-to-one
and one-to-zero logic transitions using the inputs Vg,x and
Vg,y respectively.
Now, the defense mechanism of the proposed BIST-RS
architecture in confronting the malicious free layer thickness
(Tm) variations is discussed. As the first and most important
step, the BIST-RS clock frequency should be set to the desired
clock frequency for the main circuit exactly. Then, the BIST-
RS is turned ON and different test patterns are applied to the
data encoder. Next, the data decoder captures the message at
the clock cycle positive edge and evaluates its integrity. The
message content might be wrong due to possible transition
delay fault(s) caused by the infected MTJ(s). An infected MTJ
is found by notification from the data decoder error signal. The
illustration of this concept is shown in Figure 7. As it can be
observed, all the considered free layer thickness possibilities
for zero-to-one and one-to-zero logic transitions are completed
in the duration of 7.5 ns to 9.76 ns and 7.5 ns to 8.85 ns
respectively, which are before the arrival of the third clock
cycle positive edge. So, the malicious variations go undetected
in this case. However, if this clock frequency is used for the
original circuit all the times, then the attack doesn’t have any
impact on the IC functionality as well as its total performance.
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Fig. 6. The operation flow of the MTJ driving and sensing circuit.
In reality, an IC might experience heavy workloads and high
frequency computations during its lifetime. For those cases,
the BIST-RS can be set to the clock frequency under test and
the MTJ structure health is checked accordingly. The lack of
need for including additional memory resources for testing as
well as detecting faults without necessity to propagate them
throughout the circuit under test are the primary privileges of
this architecture over the traditional testing and verification
methods. Also, implementation of the encoder and decoder
modules using the TFET technology brings less energy con-
sumption and area occupation than its CMOS counterpart. The
total power consumption and area of these modules are 0.5020
µW and 1,930,400 nm2.
III. THE BIST-RS FOR MTJ UNDER ATTACK
Now, let’s consider a scenario in which a malicious person
is aware of the inserted BIST-RS inside the chip and aims
to disrupt the testing and security checking process through
manipulating the surrounding temperature or injecting a hard-
ware Trojan inside the encryption/decryption module. For this
scenario, we propose a general identification technique in this
section, according to which any unusual behavior shown from
the employed encryption/decryption module for MTJ testing
can be discovered. Our technique performs the detection
mechanism based upon the circuit analog signals rather than
its digital data. Most of the detection techniques in the area of
hardware security are developed in the digital domain, and
the analog domain-based techniques have not been studied
sufficiently [8].
In fact, the analog signals of an integrated circuit have
unique variations, behavior, and features that can be used
for detection, identification and monitoring purposes. The
methodology of our technique can be divided into four steps:
(a) choosing and applying a specific test pattern (i.e. based
on its fault coverage capability) to the circuit under test and
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Fig. 7. The MTJ driving and sensing circuit output under malicious free layer
thickness variations.
extracting an analog signal (i.e. the current signal in here),
which is considered as the reference signal. This signal is
correlated to the circuit properties. (b) automatic random
selection of a certain number of test patterns (i.e. twenty
in here), applying them to the circuit, and collecting all of
the corresponding analog signals in order to build a dataset.
Certain features may be extracted from the signals for the
purpose of comparison in this step. (c) running a relational
detector (i.e. the maximum of the absolute value of the cross
correlation between the reference signal and a test signal)
between the reference signal (i.e. obtaining when the circuit
operates in normal condition) and all of the test signals inside
the dataset in order to construct the ”Evaluation Signal”.
(d) accepting or rejecting the evaluation signal depending on
the detector threshold value (i.e. the mean of the reference
evaluation signal) and its sensitivity, and calculating four
basic statistical metrics for analyzing the detector performance.
The four metrics for analysis of the detector performance
are: True Positive (i.e. a signal is correctly rejected as not
having originated from the original circuit), False Positive (i.e.
a signal is wrongly rejected as not having originated from
the original circuit), True Negative (i.e. a signal is correctly
accepted as having originated from the original circuit), False
Negative (i.e. a signal is wrongly accepted as having originated
from the original circuit).
The presented approach is examined in two experiments.
In the first experiment, four datasets are collected from
the cyclic redundancy check data decoder circuit using the
CMOS 20nm Predictive Technology Model (PTM) - Multi
Gate (MG) technology [9]. The circuit operating conditions
for these datasets are defined as: (1) normal condition; (2)
process variations (i.e. changing the transistor length within
± 20% range); (3) temperature variations (i.e. changing the
temperature from 20◦C to 120◦C); and (4) malicious condition
(i.e. a hardware Trojan is inserted inside the circuit). The
designed hardware Trojan for this circuit is activated according
to a logical AND function output with having the executed
XOR function outputs on the CRC data decoder input pattern
and the generated ”Check Value” as its inputs, and its payload
is the error signal malfunction. For the second experiment,
only the normal condition and the malicious condition datasets
are collected for the 32-bit KATAN block cipher [10], which
its encryption and decryption modules can be used in the
MTJ testing architecture as well. The inserted Trojan in the
KATAN circuit has the duty of flipping the first and the last
bits of the ciphertext, and is awakened according to a logical
AND function output with having the executed XOR function
outputs on a portion of the key and a portion of the plaintext
as its inputs.
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Fig. 8. The comparison between the current signals of the healthy and the
malicious CRC data decoders.
The top plot of Figure 8 shows the comparison between
the current signals of the healthy CRC data decoder circuit
(i.e. the normal condition) when the reference pattern and an
arbitrary test pattern are applied. As it can be seen, the signals
have the same trend and very well lie on each other at least
for the first 100 data points. However, the middle plot of this
figure demonstrates that there are still differences between
the current signals for those data points. The comparison
between the current signals of the healthy and the malicious
CRC data decoders (i.e. the normal and malicious conditions
respectively) when the same input pattern is applied can be
observed in the bottom plot of the figure. Similarly, the signals
have the same trend with minor differences, except some data
points that the differences can be up to 40,000 times higher
that is due to the hardware Trojan effect. Therefore, it can
5be interpreted that: (a) the circuit current signal is time and
test pattern variant; and (b) the extracted current signals from
applying two different input patterns have dissimilar variations
at any given time, even if they have the same overall trend. In
fact, these variations can cause a specific change in the level
of the evaluation signal. The calculated evaluation signals for
the four datasets of the CRC data decoder along with their
threshold value are demonstrated in Figure 9.
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Fig. 9. The analysis of the evaluation signals for the four datasets of the CRC
data decoder.
It can be comprehended from the figure that the evaluation
signal of the first dataset is nearly stable and has the least
amount of variations, which is due to not having remarkable
variations among different applied input patterns in the circuit
normal condition. The evaluation signals of the second and
the third datasets have larger variations with having relatively
constant behavior. The evaluation signal of the fourth dataset
has the largest amount of variations and its behavior may be
considered as abnormal in comparison with the other datasets.
In the next step, the four basic statistical metrics for analysis
of the detector performance with different levels of sensitivity
are calculated. The results for these metrics using the four
datasets of the CRC data decoder are presented in Table I.
According to the definitions of the four basic statistical
metrics, the detector shows perfect performance in identi-
fication of the circuit in the normal condition as well as
detection of the hardware Trojan. Also, it demonstrates a good
performance in identifying the circuit when the variations of
the process technology and the temperature are acceptable.
Similar performance capability can be observed from the
detector in identification of the KATAN block cipher circuit,
which is shown in Table II.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a built-in-self-test architecture
for security checking of the MTJ device under malicious
process variations attack. The architecture consists of three
main elements: sender, physical transmission medium (i.e. an
array of the MTJ cells), and receiver. A healthy array of MTJ
cells doesn’t change the sent information and delivers them
 
 Threshold Range Boundary (%) 
True Negative 
Rate 
False Negative 
Rate 
True Positive 
Rate 
False Positive 
Rate 
Dataset 1 
1 0.5 0 0 0.5 
2.5 0.85 0 0 0.15 
5 0.95 0 0 0.05 
10 1.0 0 0 0 
25 1.0 0 0 0 
Dataset 2 
1 0.05 0 0 0.95 
2.5 0.1 0 0 0.9 
5 0.1 0 0 0.9 
10 0.65 0 0 0.35 
25 0.9 0 0 0.1 
Dataset 3 
1 0.05 0 0 0.95 
2.5 0.1 0 0 0.9 
5 0.1 0 0 0.9 
10 0.15 0 0 0.85 
25 0.35 0 0 0.65 
Dataset 4 
1 0 0 1.0 0 
2.5 0 0 1.0 0 
5 0 0.05 0.95 0 
10 0 0.2 0.8 0 
25 0 0.35 0.65 0 
 
TABLE I
THE ANALYSIS OF THE DETECTOR PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF SENSITIVITY FOR THE CRC DATA DECODER.
Security Analysis of Trojan-Free and Trojan-Inserted KATAN Module 
 
 Threshold Range Boundary (%) 
True Negative 
Rate 
False Negative 
Rate 
True Positive 
Rate 
False Positive 
Rate 
Dataset 1 
1 0 0 0 1.0 
2.5 0.05 0 0 0.95 
5 0.25 0 0 0.75 
10 0.40 0 0 0.60 
25 0.65 0 0 0.35 
Dataset 2 
1 0 0 1.0 0 
2.5 0 0.10 0.90 0 
5 0 0.15 0.85 0 
10 0 0.30 0.70 0 
25 0 0.60 0.40 0 
 
 
 True Positive (TP): A signal is correctly rejected as not having originated from the original circuit. 
 
 False Positive (FP): A signal is wrongly rejected as not having originated from the original circuit. 
 
 True Negative (TN): A signal is correctly accepted as having originated from the original circuit. 
 
 False Negative (FN): A signal is wrongly accepted as having originated from the original circuit. 
TABLE II
THE ANALYSIS OF THE DETECTOR PERFORMANCE WITH DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF SENSITIVITY FOR THE KATAN BLOCK CIPHER.
to the receiver on time for integrity checking. The lack of
need for including additional memory resources for testing as
well as detecting faults without necessity to propagate them
throughout the circuit under test are the primary privileges of
this architecture over the traditional testing and verification
methods. Also, a general identification technique is presented
to discover any abnormal behavior and activity shown from
the employed circuitries within the architecture. According to
this technique, the existing features inside the current signal
of a circuit under test can be used in order to identify it
in different conditions, distinguish it from different circuits,
and detect its possible infection caused by a hardware Trojan.
The experimental results show that the technique has adequate
performance in identifying the circuit under test in normal
and malicious conditions as well as under typical process and
temperature variations.
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